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Abstract:
The aim of this paper is to examine the relationship between food insecurity and conflict events short of war in
Africa, taking account of a host of mediating factors, including the degree of inequality, the level of develop-
ment, democratic quality, quality of governance and the degree of government expenditure, which we incor-
porate into our analysis. Our results suggest that food price volatility does contribute significantly to conflict
events measured by political events in Africa (ACLED). Greater democracy can engender more conflict, but in
a non-linear fashion. The broader V-DEM participatory index of democracy also encourages more protest. Our
governance variables are significant, emphasising the salience of state capacity in this regard. An innovation of
our study is the inclusion of inequality. We deploy two metrics of vertical inequality: the GINI coefficient and
the broader V-DEM egalitarian index. The GINI index of income inequality has a counter-intuitive statistically
insignificant sign, suggesting that greater income equality or middle-class share of income results in greater
political unrest. We also utilise political measures of inter-group horizontal inequality which significantly en-
gender conflict risk.
Keywords: food price, conflict, institutions, government expenditure, inequality
DOI: 10.1515/peps-2018-0007
1 Introduction
It is now accepted that large scale violent internal or intra-state conflict is a major factor underlying develop-
mental failure in low and middle income countries; see, for example, Collier et al. (2003) and Murshed (2010).
The seeds of conflict can be found in the prevalence of poverty, as poverty constrains livelihood choices to
the point where the risks associated with violence become acceptable; equally internal conflict hampers eco-
nomic growth and disadvantages development, such that poverty reduction in the presence of conflict is more
arduous. Thus, internal conflict is of serious concern to the development community, including academics, pol-
icy makers at the national as well as international level and other practitioners. More recently, the inequality
explanations for conflict are once more rising to the fore; see, Østby (2013), as well as Cederman, Gleditsch,
and Buhaug (2013). The aim of this paper is to examine the relationship between food insecurity and conflict
events short of war (mass demonstrations, protests and so on) in Africa, taking into account the mediating role
of the degree of development, the extent of government expenditure, the quality of political institutions and
governance, as well as the role of inequality in this connection.
The principal form of war nowadays is civil war in developing countries. There were signs that civil war
incidence (the number of civil wars and countries embroiled in them) and intensity (the number of fatalities)
was on the wane (Gleditsch, 2008) before the beginning of this decade, but other forms of violence associated
with mass protest and state suppression of these were also a matter of growing concern. With regard to the
relationship between food insecurity and conflict, it is important to differentiate the type of conflict between
wars (civil war and insurgency), and other conflict events short of war (mass demonstrations, protests and so
on). We study the latter type of conflict in this paper, focussing on these events in Africa.
Since time immemorial food shortages and food price increases have sparked social unrest. It needs to be
borne in mind that the association between food insecurity1 or food price volatility and social unrest is indirect,
including the mediating effect of a variety of other factors. It is indirect because a heightened sense of food
insecurity brought about by rising or volatile food prices feeds into other fundamental causes of conflict, usually
pre-existing grievances and state failure. Rising food prices lower the real income of food consumers, who for
a given income are less able to purchase a fixed food basket without jeopardising their consumption of other
SyedMansoobMurshed is the corresponding author.
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goods and services, and the demand for basic foodstuffs is notoriously inelastic. Those affected are consumers
(not net producers) of food, particularly low income households, but alsomiddle-class consumers in developed
countrieswhowitness an erosion of their living standards. Clearly, poorer nations aremore at the risk of conflict,
following food price increases. Rising food prices are unlikely to be the sole cause of conflict, notwithstanding
the examples of the Arab Spring in 2011, the revolutions in Europe in 1848, and famously the French revolution
of 1789 which followed a bad harvest. History is replete with instances of food price increases following poor
harvests that do not lead to major riots or revolutions, usually because of countervailing action mitigating the
effects of food price increases by the state. Thus, for food price spikes to cause conflict they have to fuel existing
grievances against the state or other groups, as well as the inability of the state to manage, suppress or placate
these grievances. Also, food prices have become increasingly globalised, and the transmission of international
shock to domestic prices is more rapid in recent years.
The adverse effects of rising food insecurity are likely to be more acute in poorer countries with a poor
record of economic growth and where poverty is widespread. Furthermore, food insecurity is more likely to
lead to conflict, whether in the form of protest or war, in more unequal societies and where mitigating policies
are not pursued by the state. Thus, the political system is important, as is the fiscal capacity of the state to
undertake mitigating policies and good governance. Food insecurity ultimately can act as a tipping point that
turns relative deprivation, grievances, as well as inter-group and inter-household inequality into conflict in
the form of protest and/or war in the presence of weak state capacity. The current, cross-country empirical
literature does not incorporate all these mediating factors into their empirical strategy, as can be observed from
our brief literature review in Section 2. This is followed by a discussion of our empirical strategy for linking food
insecurity and conflict in Section 3. Our empirical findings are presented in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Reviewof the cross-country empirical literature
One of the earliest papers on this theme is by Miguel, Satynath, and Sergenti (2004) who looked at the impact
of economic growth on the risk of civil war. By treating economic growth as endogenous to conflict (as there is
a reverse causality problem), and by using the rainfall rate as the instrument for growth in 41 African countries
during 1980–1999, Miguel, Satynath, and Sergenti (2004) find that growth is negatively and strongly related to
civil war. A negative growth shock of five percentage points increases the likelihood of civil war by one-half in
the following year. Food insecurity, on impact, is likely to have a negative impact on national income in poorer,
low-income, developing countries.
Brinkman and Hendrix (2011) in a work for the World Food Programme (WFP) provide a general thematic
overviewof the link between food insecurity andviolent conflict in its various forms includingwars anddemon-
strations. They look at case studies of various developing countries, and explicit policy responses in “fragile”
states to rising food prices during the recent spike in 2007–2008.
In a paper on food prices and political instability, Arezki and Brückner (2011) look at the effect of food
prices on political instability in a cross-section of 120 countries in the 1970–2007 period. For prices they con-
struct a country specific index of international food prices with a time invariant average value of net exports
(net exports over GDP) of a food commodity for the entire sample period. When the international price of a
food commodity rises, it has a negative wealth effect on the country’s national income if the country is a net
importer, and vice versa if it is a net exporter. They look at the effect of variations in international food prices on
democracy/autocracy scores using the polity data, the incidence of civil war from the PRIO-Uppsala (UCDP)
data set, and the Arthur Banks2 data on the number of riots and demonstrations. They find that food price
increases lower democracy scores and increase the number of riots and demonstrations, as well as civil wars in
low-income countries but not in rich countries. Furthermore, in the post cold war era the effects of food price
increases are heightened for demonstrations and some other forms of conflict.
Bellemare (2014) analyses the effect of food price insecurity on conflict for the 1990–2011 period. The period
of analysis is monthly rather than the standard annual analysis. He used the Food and Agricultural Organisa-
tion’s (FAO)data on the index of international prices, aswell as other foodprice indices, such as those for cereals,
whichweighmore heavily on the typical food basket in poor countries. Hismeasure of food insecuritywas both
food price levels, and its volatility measured by a coefficient of variation for the proximate three months. The
conflict variable is incidents for the month based on a LexisNexis search of English language sources of reports
on incidents such as food riots. He followed an instrumental variable approach due to potential endogeneity of
food prices and conflict, using natural disasters as an instrument, similar to the rainfall instrument employed
byMiguel, Satynath, and Sergenti (2004). He finds that food price increases do causemore conflict, but not food
price volatility.
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Hendrix and Haggard (2015) in their study between 1961 and 2010 use a number of control variables cover-
ing unrest in Asian and African countries where they argue that 92% of the world’s food insecurity lies. They
utilise a food price index from UNCTAD, as well as polity scores, data on urban bias in agricultural policies,
the degree of international trade openness, growth in national income (GDP) and levels of national income.
Their dependent variable is urban unrest in Africa and Asia drawn from the PRIO Urban Social Disturbance
database. This variable includes all forms of unrest, not just violent cases. The results are contingent on regime
type with democracies and anocracies (polities with characteristics of both democracies and autocracies) more
prone to unrest after food price rises, and rural bias also contributes to more urban unrest after a food crisis.
Smith (2014) in his analysis of urban unrest for African countries in the 1990–2012 period utilises domestic
foodprices obtained from the ILO, an instrumental variable approach using global grain prices and local rainfall
as instruments. The controls are regime type, the share of urban population, share of youth in the population,
GDP per capita, life expectancy and infant mortality. Changes in domestic food prices do contribute to urban
unrest.
Weinberg and Bakker (2014) also utilise a measure of domestic food prices in their analysis covering 71
countries from 1972 to 2007. They convert global prices into a domestic price proxy using a consumer tax equiv-
alent (CTE) based on data from the World Bank. Their measure of conflict is drawn from the Banks data set
on riots, demonstrations and government crises. They control for regime type, urban population, ethnic frac-
tionalisation and economic growth. Using count data methods changes in food prices do raise the risk of the
conflict types described. Thus governments that prevent food price increases (the transmission of external price
shocks) largely avoid food price based unrest, thus underlying the importance of countervailing policies when
food crises occur.
Raleigh, Choi, and Kniveton (2015) in their disaggregated study look at 113 African markets in 24 countries
from 1997 to 2010. Their work also looks at climatic factors such as dryness and rainfall. Their conflict data is
drawn from a PRIOdata base (ACLED),which includes the locality of the conflict. The novelty of their approach
is the simultaneous determination of local food commodity prices and conflict. Interventions in local markets
can mitigate the effects of both conflict and climate factors on food prices. Natalini, Jones, and Bravo (2015)
look at which political or governance measure best captures the propensity for food price riots, finding that
the World Bank’s Political Instability and Absence of Violence is the best indicator. Within the transmission
mechanism, the political stability of the state is important in turning food price increases to riots. They also
identify food price thresholds, above which riots are more likely.
3 Empiricalmethodology
Our empirical strategy investigates the effect of food insecurity (both level and volatility of food prices) on con-
flict events, while exploring the impact of different measures of institutional quality and inequality as explana-
tory variables with different specifications within this nexus. Our dependent variable on social unrest utilises
data on conflict events is obtained from the PRIO-ACLED (armed conflict location and event data project) data
set which records protests and political violence for Africa at a sub-national level. This data, as well as our
other data, are annualised at the country-year level. In this way, and particularly because our data is on po-
litical events and not war, we avoid endogeneity issues between political events and food price volatility. The
Annex to the paper gives the country coverage and descriptive statistics on all the variables employed in our
study.
The main independent variable of interest relates to food price insecurity. Here both food price levels and
volatility in food prices need to be examined, but mainly the latter. Food price data (in the form of consumer
price index, CPI, with base year of 2010) is taken from FAO database.3 Food price index (food CPI) includes
a complete and consistent set of time series from 2000 to 2015, compiled by FAO using population weights to
aggregate across countries. The original data is on monthly basis and we transformed this data into annualised
information by simple averaging in any given year. These indices measure the price change between the current
and reference periods of the average basket of goods and services purchased by households. Based on this price
index, price volatility index is calculated following the methodology in von Haldenwang and Ivanyna (2017).
The volatility index can be understood as the typical deviation of the variable from a quadratic time trend over
the period. In other words, it measures average volatility for this period (2000–2015).
We add other control variables, as well as mediating variables, which will be an innovation of the project. It
needs to be borne inmind that some of the earliest studies hardly control for other factors; Arezki and Brückner
(2011), for example. As primary control variables, we employ GDP per capita growth, as food price insecurity
and the governmental responses to these depend on the changes in the income level of the country, and growth
contributes to this capacity. We also use the share of youth and urban population, as a more urban or more
3
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youthful population can also contribute to conflict following food price increases via the relative deprivation
mechanism.
Whether food price volatility produces conflict, also depends on the nature of the nation’s polity: so we
will use the POLITY combined autocracy and democracy scores. Autocracies are more adept at suppressing
dissent, democracies may adopt mitigating policies. We also include the squared value of POLITY to check for
any non-linear factors in this process. In addition to POLITY, we use the varieties of democracy (V-Dem) data
set; see Coppedge et al. (2016). In particular, we use the participatory index (where a rise in value indicates
improvement) incorporating not just electoral government, but facets of direct democracy such as civil soci-
ety engagement and sub-national government powers. Hence the V-Dem measure constitutes a broader, more
encompassing, measure of democratic quality.
Unlike the rest of the literature we also employ quality of governance variables from the World Bank (see
Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2010), specifically factors such as the control of corruption, government effec-
tiveness and the rule of law.4 On the one hand, governance may matter more than regime type in managing
food insecurity, bearing in mind that good governance, and its converse, is possible in both democracies and
autocracies. But on the other hand, the type of polity is very germane to the right to protest.
Since the mechanism via which rising or volatile food prices is most likely to engender conflict (war or
protest) lie in a relative deprivation or horizontal inequality effect, it is important to explicitly incorporate in-
equality measures into the econometric model. This has not been done in any of the studies reviewed above,
and will be an innovation of our study. We propose two alternative measures related to vertical and horizon-
tal inequality. The former is particularly pertinent in the case of conflict in the form of demonstrations and
riots, short of full blown civil war. Here we could have used the All the Ginis (version 2016) database created by
BrankoMilanovic.5 We also use the egalitarian component index from the V-Dem data base. This has a political
component measuring equal access to freedoms and rights, as well as the egalitarian distribution of economic
resources across social groups, including the fulfilment of basic needs across society. Our working hypothesis
is that greater inequality fuels conflict.
As far as horizontal inequality is concerned, we can employ the ethnic power relations (EPR) dataset de-
veloped by Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug (2013). In particular we use the percentage of the politically
excluded population, the share of the excluded group size relative to the powerful ethno-political group. We
also utilise the percentage of the discriminated population who are powerless or totally discriminated against.
Data on the economic aspects of horizontal inequality (such as income) on a systematic basis across countries
is still not available to facilitate a proper panel data econometric analysis.
A further innovation of our study is to include, independent variables on state capacity such as government
expenditure.6 These are proxies for countervailing andmitigating actions by the state after food price increases.
Our identification strategy involves the incorporation of measures of polity, governance, inequality and state
capacity, as they are the mechanisms via which rising food prices can lead to conflict, as well as the avenues via
which discontent at food price increases may be managed. In some instances, it may be worthwhile interacting
some of these variables with food price increasemeasures to examine the strength of mechanisms in themiddle
of the process of how food price increases leads to more conflict.
To summarise,we carry out static panel data analysis, and the period of analysis is from2000 to 2015 covering
40 countries inAfrica using ordinary least squares.We carry out pooled (cross section and time series) estimates
as well as fixed and random effects panel estimates along with Hausman tests in each individual estimate. The
model is specified as:
Conflictit = 𝛽𝑜 + 𝛽1Food Insecurityit + 𝛽2𝑋it + 𝛾t + vi + 𝜖it (1)
We utilise both a food price index and food price volatility separately as a measure of food insecurity in the
model. X represents a set of control variables as discussed, vi are country fixed effects that captures time-
invariant country specific unobservable characteristics and γt are year fixed effects to capture any variation in
conflict between years which might not be covered by the explanatory variables in the model. The idiosyncratic
error term is indicated by ϵit.
4 Empirical ﬁndings
In Table 1, our base line regressions, both food prices and its volatility tend to be significant except for the
fixed effects estimators. Growth in per-capita GDP significantly reduces conflict risk, as our sample is mainly
composed of low-incomeAfrican economies; as countries become richer they face less food price related conflict
4
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risk. Also, government spending tends to significantly lower the incidence of protest, although the signs of the
share of urban and youth population are counter-intuitively negative, but mostly insignificant.
Table 1: Conflict events (ACLED-UCDP) and food prices.
Variables Conflict events (ACLED UCDP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pooled Pooled FE FE RE RE
Food price 1.027*** 0.423 1.443***
(0.334) (0.664) (0.321)
Food price volatility 190.346*** 145.942 222.848***
(56.692) (109.654) (62.428)
Government expenditure
(% of GDP)
−1.907* −1.977* −4.299*** −4.119** −2.386* −1.258
(1.017) (1.017) (1.632) (1.628) (1.331) (1.298)
GDP per capita growth −4.615*** −4.397*** −6.262*** −6.057*** −5.679*** −5.127***
(1.397) (1.396) (1.341) (1.339) (1.300) (1.312)
Urban population (% of
total)
−2.654*** −2.327*** −1.688 −1.195 −2.083* −1.617
(0.610) (0.609) (6.448) (6.450) (1.190) (1.180)
Youth population (% of
total)
−10.196*** −10.643*** 0.441 0.716 −7.433** −10.647***
(2.086) (2.086) (8.370) (8.357) (3.692) (3.690)
Constant 586.472*** 652.320*** 197.379 146.441 432.990** 601.547***
(121.706) (119.365) (392.773) (394.519) (203.309) (200.928)
Observations 499 499 499 499 499 499
Number of countries 40 40 40 40 40 40
Standard errors in parentheses. Fixed effect specifications (column 3 and 4) included period fixed effect which are not presented in the
table. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Hausman tests suggest that the random effect static panel estimator would be a superior estimator of
our model.
In Table 2, we introduce polity and institutional variables in the regressions with conflict events.7 These
additional variables relate to the quality of democracy drawn from polity, as well as another quality of democ-
racy measure, the participatory index, drawn from V-Dem, also governance variables: corruption, government
effectiveness and the rule of law. Data on the latter three variables are drawn from the well-knownWorld Bank-
Kaufmann, Kraay, andMastruzzi (2010) data set. All the governance variables are significant and have the right
sign (except polity variable, although the squared term remains significant). This indicates a non-linear rela-
tionship with conflict. Although greater democracy promotes more civil war risk, this starts to decline after a
certain level of democracy is reached, as found by Hegre et al. (2001). Also, food price volatility continues to
significantly enhance the risk of political protest events. In African nations, governance may matter more, and
greater political participation can promote protest. Interestingly, the effect of government expenditure loses
significance in explaining unrest, implying that governance matters more.
Table 2: Conflict events – food price volatility in the presence of institutions.
Random effects model
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Food price volatility 222.848*** 217.604*** 235.175*** 216.818*** 233.732*** 249.894***
(62.428) (66.503) (67.063) (66.564) (62.538) (65.854)
Control of corruption −85.008***
(26.749)
Government effectiveness −94.740***
(29.481)
Rule of law −112.643***
(28.711)
Participatory component
index
291.388**
(113.503)
Polity2 4.503
(3.032)
(Polity2)2 −1.289**
5
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(0.626)
Government expenditure
(% of GDP)
−1.258 −0.579 −0.785 −0.239 −1.415 −1.096
(1.298) (1.350) (1.366) (1.361) (1.301) (1.370)
GDP per capita growth −5.127*** −5.781*** −5.429*** −5.568*** −4.808*** −4.667***
(1.312) (1.470) (1.478) (1.462) (1.310) (1.346)
Urban population (% of
total)
−1.617 −2.010* −2.048* −1.947 −1.746 −1.722
(1.180) (1.156) (1.223) (1.195) (1.204) (1.223)
Youth population (% of
total)
−10.647*** −13.134*** −14.358*** −13.647*** −12.289*** −12.021***
(3.690) (3.726) (3.980) (3.819) (3.796) (3.865)
Constant 601.547*** 654.847*** 696.947*** 642.751*** 558.835*** 684.004***
(200.928) (200.332) (210.465) (204.857) (204.138) (210.690)
Observations 499 463 463 463 499 485
Number of countries 40 40 40 40 40 39
Standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
In Table 3, we attempt to interact food price volatility with our institutional variables. Our aim is to gauge
what mediating effect institutional quality in the form of either the quality of democracy or the effectiveness
of governance has on the conflict enhancing aspects of food price volatility. Although all interactions have the
correct signs, the interaction effect with the broader participatory definition of democracy drawn from the V-
DEM data set is the only significant effect.
Table 3: Conflict events – food price volatility and interaction with institutions.
Random effects model
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Food price volatility 217.487** 227.638** 278.750*** 618.394*** 248.631***
(109.911) (113.781) (107.255) (203.129) (65.759)
Control of corruption −84.978***
(31.856)
Food volatility*control of corruption −0.640
(105.053)
Government effectiveness −94.623***
(34.171)
Food volatility*govt. effectiveness −9.551
(108.190)
Rule of law −126.772***
(33.989)
Food volatility*Rule of law 71.234
(97.207)
Participatory component index 423.534***
(130.637)
Food volatility*participatory index −985.540**
(496.642)
Polity2 5.910*
(3.462)
Food volatility*polity2 −10.748
(12.790)
(Polity2)2 −1.282**
(0.624)
Government expenditure (% of GDP) −0.564 −0.782 −0.034 −1.701 −1.256
(1.378) (1.382) (1.388) (1.310) (1.380)
GDP per capita growth −5.787*** −5.434*** −5.502*** −4.873*** −4.722***
(1.472) (1.481) (1.465) (1.306) (1.348)
Urban population (% of total) −1.990* −2.030 −1.903 −1.873 −1.753
(1.171) (1.238) (1.209) (1.222) (1.214)
Youth population (% of total) −13.129*** −14.401*** −13.558*** −13.410*** −12.281***
(3.766) (4.019) (3.858) (3.869) (3.857)
Constant 653.409*** 698.102*** 620.910*** 567.388*** 700.078***
(203.669) (213.523) (208.669) (206.048) (210.441)
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Observations 463 463 463 499 485
Number of countries 40 40 40 40 39
Standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
In Table 4, we examine the impact of inequality. In order to isolate its effect from institutional factors that
maymitigate or exacerbate its impact on conflict we drop the institutional variables in this analysis. We wish to
incorporate income inequality in the form of GINI coefficients (the greater the coefficient the higher the degree
of inequality). So given our postulate that inequality enhances conflict, wewould expect that sign to be positive.
We also utilise themore hybrid egalitarian component indexwhichmeasures the equality of rights across social
groups as well as the provision and coverage of basic needs. The higher the index the more egalitarian is the
society in question, hence our expectation for the sign of this coefficient is negative. These two measures (the
GINI and egalitarian index) are our measures of vertical inequality, the first being intra-household the latter
being socio-economic group based. Thenwe have themeasures of inter-ethnic group horizontal inequality from
the EPR data set. We would expect their signs to be positive because, as constructed, a higher value implies
greater inter-group inequality.
Table 4: Conflict events – food price volatility in the presence of inequality.
Random effects model
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Food price volatility 222.848*** 215.430*** 291.346*** 45.056 71.326** 58.468*
(62.428) (62.495) (109.420) (32.806) (34.237) (32.401)
Egalitarian component
index
−82.881
(91.839)
Gini index −0.822
(2.030)
Share of excluded
population to
ethno-politically relevant
population (log)
26.225***
(4.864)
Discriminated population
(in %)
14.617
(65.012)
Powerless population (in
%)
217.842***
(35.359)
Government expenditure
(% of GDP)
−1.258 −1.251 −1.432 −1.042 −1.729** −0.946
(1.298) (1.291) (2.434) (0.802) (0.811) (0.797)
GDP per capita growth −5.127*** −5.178*** −2.219 −2.242** −2.389** −2.491***
(1.312) (1.315) (2.881) (0.885) (0.929) (0.872)
Urban population (% of
total)
−1.617 −1.613 −2.216 0.184 −0.874 −0.150
(1.180) (1.153) (1.549) (0.983) (0.907) (0.998)
Youth population (% of
total)
−10.647*** −10.555*** −13.597*** −0.422 −2.058 −0.606
(3.690) (3.619) (4.463) (2.733) (2.621) (2.763)
Constant 601.547*** 643.544*** 758.868*** 59.644 224.579 98.934
(200.928) (202.215) (270.029) (149.513) (142.225) (149.806)
Observations 499 499 169 393 393 393
Number of countries 40 40 33 38 38 38
Standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Egalitarianism has the expected negative effect on political unrest events although the coefficient is insignif-
icant. The other horizontal inequality measures all have the correct sign. They are also significant with the ex-
ception of the percentage of the discriminated. The coefficient on GINI appears with a counter-intuitive sign,
but is statistically insignificant. This may be because greater income equality, particularly a higher middle class
income share, may spark more protest. Also, control variables such as per capita income growth are significant.
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5 Conclusions
Since time immemorial food shortages and food price increases have sparked social unrest. Indeed, the col-
loquial Egyptian Arabic word for bread, ayesh, also means life. Food price increases do not necessarily spark
widespread protest or civil war or revolution. The degree of any resultant conflict, depend on a host of factors
including the degree of inter-personal and inter-group inequality, the income level of the country, its relative
urban and youth population share, its polity, quality of governance, the degree of social protection or govern-
ment expenditure and state capacity. Not all studies in the realm of the cross-country empirical analysis of food
insecurity and conflict incorporate all of these factors. Our innovation lies therein.
The consequences of internal conflict are not confined to the territories of countries in which it takes place,
but as major international spill-overs to other countries. Chief among these are humanitarian crises involving
refugees and assistance to those affected by conflict, but also complex humanitarian crises such as famine can
be a consequence of civil war. It may also effect the ability of food importers to source foodstuff from conflict
affected exporters, as conflict can disrupt supply chains, as well as food production. Consequently internal
conflict on a large scale should be viewed as a global problem, and its mitigation, management and prevention
should be seen to be a global public good.
Our results suggest that food prices, and especially food price volatility, do contribute statistically signifi-
cantly to social and political unrest risk measured by political events in Africa (measured by the ACLED data).
The growth in per-capita income is significant and has the right negative sign, indicating that richer coun-
tries face less food price related political unrest. Government expenditure as a share of national income has
the correct negative sign, but becomes insignificant once we introduce institutional quality and inequality. It
suggests that in African nations governance may matter more, and greater political participation can promote
protest. Other control variables such as the youth and urban share occasionally have unexpected signs in our
regressions, but these are mostly insignificant.
We have underscored the mediating role of “institutions” in the food price (volatility)-conflict nexus. The
institutional variables that we employ can be divided in to two categories. First, we utilised political institu-
tions, which are a measure of process. We chose to measure these using the well-known POLITY measure of
the degree of autocracy-democracy, and the much broader participatory index drawn from the newly launched
V-DEMdata set. The lattermeasure containsmanymore facets related to the degree of citizens and social group
participation in political processes, and also does not suffer from the limitation of the POLITY data set which is
endogenous to conflict, as the democracy and autocracy score of a country in any year is affected by the emer-
gence of conflict. Be that as it may, our results indicate that greater democracy can engender more conflict,
especially when it comes to protests, riots or other disturbances, but after a certain threshold of higher demo-
cratic development greater democracy is conflict abating. The V-DEM participatory index can also encourage
more protest.
The second set of our institutional variables pertain to outcomes related to the quality of governance: the
rule of law, the control of corruption and the effectiveness of government administration. They emerge with the
right negative signs and are significant, implying lesser conflict in the presence of good governance.  Further-
more, the degree of government expenditure as a proportion of national income loses its salience, becoming
statistically insignificant once governance variables are included in the regressions. This emphasises the im-
portance of the mediating role of institutions and state capacity when it comes to unrest induced by food price
volatility.
An innovation of our study is the inclusion of inequality. We deploy two metrics of inter-personal or inter-
household vertical inequality: theGINI coefficient of income inequality and theV-DEMegalitarian index,which
is a broader measure of how egalitarian a society is. The V-DEM egalitarian index emerges with the correct
expected signs, suggesting that more inequality breeds more conflict. The GINI index of income inequality,
however, has a counter-intuitive statistically insignificant sign, implying that greater income equalitymay result
in a greater risk of political unrest surrounding food price volatility. This may be very well the case, as greater
equality implies a higher middle class share of income, and it is precisely these groups who are politically more
vocal. We also utilise measures of inter-group or horizontal inequality in its political dimensions. These result
in expected signs; more horizontal inequality leads to greater conflict and is quite often statistically significant.
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Annex
Descriptive Statistics andCountry List
Descriptive statistics, 2000–2015.
Variables Mean Std. dev Observations
Conflict variables
 Number of conflict events in a year (ACLED UCDP) 111.94 260.21 640
Food price
 International food price index 89.62 31.37 633
 International food price volatility index 0.15 0.15 633
Institutions
 Control of corruption −0.60 0.53 557
 Government effectiveness −0.67 0.53 557
 Rule of law −0.63 0.52 557
 Polity2 1.12 5.12 582
 Participatory component index 0.41 0.13 640
Macroeconomic variables
 Government expenditure (% of GDP) 26.99 9.31 513
 GDP per capita growth (annual %) 2.40 7.26 584
Inequality variables
 Egalitarian component index 0.54 0.17 640
 Gini index 43.64 8.66 195
 Share of excluded population relative to ethno-politically
relevant population (log)
1.62 1.72 418
 Discriminated population (in %) 0.02 0.08 418
 Powerless population (in %) 0.10 0.21 418
Others
 Urban population (% of total) 39.81 18.35 597
 Youth population (% of total) 41.45 6.03 597
List of countries
Country List.
Algeria Libya
Angola Madagascar
Benin Malawi
Botswana Mali
Burkina Faso Mauritania
Burundi Morocco
Cameroon Mozambique
Central African Republic Namibia
Chad Niger
Djibouti Nigeria
Egypt Rwanda
Equatorial Guinea Senegal
Ethiopia South Africa
Gabon Sudan
Gambia Swaziland
Ghana Tanzania
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Guinea-Bissau Togo
Kenya Tunisia
Lesotho Uganda
Liberia Zambia
Notes
1 Food insecurity can have several meanings. It can refer to the fragility of the supply of food, the diminution of food stocks, as well as
the inability of consumers to obtain food or adequate nutrition due to famine, poverty, or the lack of entitlement to social protection. Food
insecurity emanates from the volatility of food stocks aswell as price shocks,which in a globalisedworld is only partially related to domestic
factors, but also international prices. In developed countries, food insecurity mainly emanates from disruptions in the supply chain, the
shortage of domestic production due to the volatility in farmer’s incomes, resulting in the encouragement of domestic production through
agriculture subsidies, as in the European Union.
2 http://www.cntsdata.com/.
3 Data on food CPI is available at: http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/CP (accessed on 27 January 2017).
4 These scores run from −2.5 (lowest or worst) to 2.5 (highest or best). One reason for using this data rather than sources such as ICRG, is
the wide country coverage of this dataset after 1997.
5 See, https://www.gc.cuny.edu/Page-Elements/Academics-Research-Centers-Initiatives/Centers-and-Institutes/Stone-Center-on-
Socio-Economic-Inequality/Core-Faculty,-Team,-and-Affiliated-LIS-Scholars/Branko-Milanovic/Datasets, accessed 04 April 2017.
6 Annualised data on social protection and food subsidies for a cross section of developing countries over a sufficiently long time period
to enable a panel data set to be constructed was not obtainable.
7 In Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4 we only report random effects estimators, which is found to be a superior estimator by the Hausman test.
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